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The Audacity of Protecting Racist Speech under 
the National Labor Relations Act 
Michael Z. Green † 
ABSTRACT 
Imagine two employees in the private sector workplace are discussing the possibil-
ity of selecting a union to represent their interests regarding wages and working 
conditions. During this conversation, a black employee notes the importance of us-
ing their collective voices to improve working conditions and compares the activity 
of selecting a union with the Black Lives Matter protests aimed at addressing the 
killings of black men in a number of high-profile incidents within the last couple 
of years. The other employee, a white male, responds by telling the black employee 
that “nothing will be gained from mentioning Black Lives Matter in this union 
organizing campaign. Black Lives Matter just represents a crusade to address 
what happened to a bunch of N-word criminals who got what they deserved. All 
lives matter.” The white male employee also stated “they need to stop being dis-
tracted by issues of race and focus on the only division that matters in the work-
place: class.” 
 
One might be surprised to learn that the white male’s statement could arguably be 
protected under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB), the agency charged with enforcing the NLRA, has re-
cently held that employees engaged in concerted activity on a picket line may utter 
racial epithets at black workers with impunity. Additionally, the NLRB has a long 
history of allowing employees engaged in concerted activity to respond to their su-
pervisors with vile and disgusting language that arguably includes the use of ra-
cial epithets. Further, the NLRB places the burden on the employer to show that 
utterances of racial epithets in the workplace would clearly result in the same dis-
ciplinary action taken absent any concerted activity associated with the communi-
cations. The question of whether offensive and racist statements should be pro-
tected under the NLRA, when uttered by employees arguably engaged in concerted 
activity, raises a problem that has not yet been adequately addressed by the NLRB. 
 
This Article asserts that in its decisions protecting employee use of racist speech 
while engaged in concerted activity, the NLRB has failed to consider the important 
 
 † Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law. I would like to thank the Texas A&M 
research grant program for its support and students Christopher Breton, Christen Sutton, Kyle 
Carney, Alyssa Urban, Derek McKee, and Kaitlyn Pound for providing diligent research and as-
sistance in completing this Article. I would also like to thank the student editors of The University 
of Chicago Legal Forum for thoughtfully editing drafts of this Article. 
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operational and legal concerns that employers face in attempting to prevent har-
assment in the workplace based on race, a requirement under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Incidents of racism being highlighted nationally by the Black 
Lives Matter movement make this an important time for the NLRB, a federal 
agency concerned about workplace rights, to not send such a strong message that 
employees may utter racial epithets without any consequences. Further, these 
NLRB decisions send a broader, wrongful and even retaliatory message to black 
employees concerned about the use of racial epithets in the workplace: that nothing 
will happen if black employees protest this disruptive and offensive activity. This 
Article will review the important NLRB decisions regarding what is referred to as 
the audacity of protecting racist workplace speech under the NLRA. The Article 
will suggest an analytical change to how the NLRB should balance protection of 
concerted activity under the NLRA with the disruptive workplace activity of utter-
ing racial epithets. The proposed change suggests an analytical framework that 
does not deter black employee protest of this disruptive behavior and accommo-
dates Title VII’s broad retaliation analysis. 
I. INTRODUCTION: LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR RACIST SPEECH UNDER 
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT IN A BLACK LIVES 
MATTER CLIMATE 
It should be no surprise that an employee’s utterance of racist 
speech in the workplace, especially the use of the N-word,1 could subject 
that employee to disciplinary action.2 Harvard law professor, Randall 
Kennedy, has explained the significance of uttering this word: 
Any person in the United States should be aware of the N-word. 
Ignorance could be very costly. Failing to recognize it as the sig-
nal of danger that it often is could well lead to injury, just as 
using it unaware of its effects and consequences could well cost 
a person his reputation, his job, or even his life.3 
As a result, one might clearly expect that an employee who uses the N-
word or any other form of racist speech in the workplace would be plac-
ing his job in jeopardy. 
 
 1 Although some believe that it is important to use the actual word to represent its impact, I 
have specifically chosen to not use the actual word if not necessary and believe that any reader 
can easily determine the actual word through the use of the euphemism, N-word. As a result, the 
only point in this Article where you will see the actual word used is when it is being quoted directly 
from a source or in the title of a citation. 
 2 See Leora F. Eisenstadt, The N-Word at Work: Contextualizing Language in the Workplace, 
33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 299, 306–10 (2012) (describing several incidents where celebrities 
and “average citizens” were all disciplined by their employers for uttering racist and offensive 
epithets due to public outrage and related concerns of the employer). 
 3 See Randall Kennedy, The David C. Baum Lecture: “Nigger!” as a Problem in the Law, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 935, 937 (2001). 
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Nevertheless, one might be surprised to find that some employees 
have resisted an employer’s disciplinary action for uttering racist state-
ments in the workplace4 by asserting that their derogatory statements 
constituted protected activity under the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA or the Act).5 Decisions by the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB or the Board), the federal agency which enforces the NLRA, 
have shielded employees from employer discipline despite the utterance 
of racial epithets.6 
Concerns about race relations in our society have become more 
prominent through the development of the Black Lives Matter move-
ment.7 By providing a unique social media vehicle for national protest 
 
 4 See infra Section II (discussing cases). This rights-based argument, while based on the 
NLRA and its statutory workplace rights, has broader implications when considering other legal 
arguments supporting rights-based protections to utter racist speech in the workplace, including 
claims under the First Amendment and contractual agreements to protect speech as part of aca-
demic freedom. Although beyond the scope of this Article, which is limited to the NLRA, and while 
also recognizing there are important policy reasons to protect even racist speech related to rights 
under these legal doctrines, these speech-based rights should be balanced with an employer’s con-
cern with providing efficiency and productivity because employees have to work together and 
should not be subjected to incivility and bullying that hamper efficiency in the workplace. See, e.g., 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 567–68 (1968) 
(referring to how the First Amendment protects public employee speech on matters of public con-
cern but also allows for balancing the government’s interest “as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138, 146–47 (1983) (discussing the public concern requirement and balancing it with the need for 
an employer to provide effective services). Even more importantly, and as highlighted herein, em-
ployers must be allowed to respond to racist utterances in the workplace to circumvent liability to 
black employees who are harmed by those statements as harassment; however, if these rights-
based arguments are allowed to prevail, they can have the pernicious effect of creating a retalia-
tory environment for black employees who are deterred from protesting racist workplace speech. 
See infra Section III. 
 5 See Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§151−69 
(2012)). 
 6 See, e.g., Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1026 (May 2, 2013) (agreeing 
with the administrative law judge’s decision that disciplinary action against a union supporter for 
the alleged use of the N-word in referring to an employee opposed to the union constituted use of 
the “anti-harassment policy to target union supporters” as pretext so that even if the employer 
“reasonably believed that [the employee] had used a racial epithet, [the Board] would find that the 
[employer] could not and did not establish that it would have disciplined her in the absence of 
union activity”), vacated on other grounds, Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, 200 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1400 
(N.L.R.B. 2014), 2014 WL 2929772 (N.L.R.B. June 27, 2014). 
 7 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Fire This Time: Black Lives Matter, Abolitionist Pedagogy 
and the Law, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 381, 386 n.15 (2015) (“‘Black Lives Matter’ was first coined by two 
black women, Alicia Garza and Patrisse Cullors, in response to George Zimmerman’s being found 
not guilty in the killing of Trayvon Martin.” (citing Nishat Kurwa, ‘Black Lives Matter’ Slogan 
Becomes a Bigger Movement, NPR (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/04/368408247/black-
lives-matter-slogan-becomes-a-bigger-movement [https://perma.cc/M8V6-YCF5])); Nicole D. Por-
ter, Expanding Public Safety in the Era of Black Lives Matter, 70 MIAMI L. REV. 533, 535 n.3 (2016) 
(“Black Lives Matter is a social justice movement and social media framework (#BlackLivesMat-
ter), founded in the United States that started after the July 2013 acquittal of George Zimmerman 
in the shooting death of Florida teenager Trayvon Martin. The movement was further animated 
by the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. The social justice organizers who 
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through the discussion of several examples of how our society has 
reached a boiling point on matters of race, the Black Lives Matter move-
ment has placed a public spotlight on racial insensitivity and also fos-
tered a broad discussion with respect to when racist speech may be reg-
ulated versus when it may be protected in the employment setting.8 
Before the Black Lives Matter movement started in response to recent 
killings of black men in Ferguson, Missouri; Charleston, South Caro-
lina; New York, New York; and Baltimore, Maryland within the past 
few years,9 employees had made racist statements while also asserting 
their legally protected right to comment.10 However, several examples 
 
conceived the term, Black Lives Matter, have asserted that it reinforces that African American 
lives, often viewed without value, are important.”). The Black Lives Matter movement website 
states that this movement was created “after Trayvon Martin’s murderer, George Zimmerman, 
was acquitted for his crime, and dead 17-year old Trayvon was posthumously placed on trial for 
his own murder.” About the Black Lives Matter Network, BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://black 
livesmatter.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/6N7S-Z67A]. 
 8 See Khanh Ho, Microaggressions in the Workplace: Black Lives Matter and Politically Cor-
rect Speech, HUFFPOST (October 8, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/khanh-ho/microaggres 
sions-in-the-w_b_8265564.html [https://perma.cc/6369-MF2Y] (describing how most black persons 
feel uncomfortable protesting racism in the workplace until they have nothing left to lose as evi-
denced with the Black Lives Matter Movement and how debates have ensued about whether the 
response that All Lives Matter represents a racist statement because of the growing backlash to 
the Black Lives Matter movement); see also Jessica Guynn, Zuckerberg Reprimands Facebook Staff 
Defacing ‘Black Lives Matter’, USA TODAY (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
tech/news/2016/02/25/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-black-lives-matter-diversity/80933694/ [https:// 
perma.cc/MC5S-ATQN] (describing how Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg responded forcefully af-
ter employees crossed out Black Lives Matter and wrote All Lives Matter on the walls of the com-
pany’s campus by launching an investigation and stating that those communications represent a 
“deeply hurtful and tiresome experience for the black community” and the comments were “unac-
ceptable” to him and how he was “very disappointed by this disrespectful behavior”). 
 9 See Lydia Polgreen, From Ferguson to Charleston and Beyond, Anguish About Race Keeps 
Building, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/us/from-ferguson-to-
charleston-and-beyond-anguish-about-race-keeps-building.html [https://perma.cc/9ANG-JVNH] 
(cataloguing common concepts involved with several incidents where an unarmed black male was 
killed by police in the cities of Ferguson, Missouri; Baltimore, Maryland; Staten Island, New York; 
North Charleston, South Carolina; and Cleveland, Ohio, as well as the rough handling of black 
teenagers at a pool party by a police officer in McKinney, Texas, while also referring to a Black 
Lives Matter march in Charleston, South Carolina as a response to a white male entering a his-
torically black church and killing nine black parishioners); see also Jelani Cobb, The Matter of 
Black Lives, NEW YORKER (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/ 
where-is-black-lives-matter-headed [https://perma.cc/82GM-8F8D] (referring to “flash points” in 
the Black Lives Matter movement as the trial of George Zimmerman for killing Trayvon Martin, 
the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and the massacre of black parishioners at 
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, all occurring during 
the second term of President Barack Obama). 
 10 See Greer v. City of Warren, 2012 WL 1014658, at *7 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 23, 2012) (finding 
that an employee’s display of a Confederate flag on MySpace, a social media website, and at home 
was protected First Amendment speech); Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 330 F.3d 250, 263–64 (2003) 
(finding that First Amendment protections were implicated where an employee refused to remove 
two Confederate flags from his tool box after a black co-worker complained, but that the employee’s 
insistence on keeping the tool box with the Confederate flags rather than getting a new tool box 
without the flags was not protected), vacated on other grounds, 369 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 2005). Cf. 
Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2003) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (finding that 
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have emerged where negative and even racist comments about the 
Black Lives Matter movement by employees have started to spark pub-
lic debate about an employer’s response to those statements when chal-
lenged.11 Any efforts aimed at protecting racist speech in the workplace 
chills all forms of black worker protest whether made pursuant to the 
Black Lives Matter movement or for some other reason. 
Furthermore, the Black Lives Matter movement has encouraged 
black workers to become more vocal in protesting racial conditions and 
employers have been faced with challenging questions about how to re-
spond to these protests.12 Probably the most recent and prominent de-
bate regarding black employee protest about racist behavior stems from 
the acts of National Football League (NFL) player, Colin Kaepernick, 
who has responded to treatment of black individuals in our society by 
the police, the same concerns of the Black Lives Matter movement, 
through kneeling during the playing of the National Anthem during 
NFL games.13 Kaepernick has been “lauded . . . and equally vilified” by 
 
racist speech by a white supremacist police officer was protected by the First Amendment as it 
involved “an employee speaking on issues of race relations entirely unrelated to his job”). However, 
the assertion of some legal right to utter a racially offensive statement does not guarantee that the 
employee will be protected from disciplinary action. See, e.g., Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 
F.3d 1177, 1187 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that a basketball coach’s use of the N-word when speaking 
to the team was not protected because it was not a matter of public concern as it did not relate to 
matters of “political, social, or other concern to the community”); Pereira v. Comm’r of Soc. Ser-
vices, 733 N.E.2d 112, 119 (Mass. 2000) (finding that an employee dismissed for making a racist 
joke had not uttered speech on a matter of public concern). 
 11 See, e.g., Sam Wood, Jefferson Health Fires Employee over Racist Facebook Post, PHIL. 
INQUIRER (July 15, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/health/20160715_A_racist_Facebook_po 
st_leads_to_firing_of_Jefferson_employee.html [https://perma.cc/W5LU-66ZZ] (describing the ter-
mination of a hospital worker for posting racist comments on Facebook about Black Lives Matter 
protesters and describing terminations of other employees including police officers, fire fighters, 
and a corrections officer for making racist statements on Facebook about the Black Lives Matter 
movement); see also Dougal Ernst, Black Lives Matter Critic Harassed for Saying ‘All Lives Matter’, 
WND (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.wnd.com/2015/11/black-lives-matter-critic-fired-for-saying-all-
lives-matter/ [https://perma.cc/7EZ3-4WBP] (discussing a female’s Facebook post arguing that “All 
Lives Matter” in response to Black Lives Matter movement and how those who felt the statement 
was racist responded to her and even suggested contacting her employer to protest her comments); 
Jarvis DeBerry, Op-ed Critical of ‘Black Lives Matter’ Followed by Cowardly Apology in Student 
Paper: Jarvis DeBerry, NOLA.COM (Sep. 26, 2015), http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2015/09/ 
wesleyan_black_lives.html [https://perma.cc/XW8A-Q7YT] (describing op-ed written in the Wes-
leyan university student newspaper by a white male staff writer criticizing the Black Lives Matter 
movement and subsequent student protests to the writer’s employer charging the op-ed as being 
racist along with requests seeking to stop funding for the student newspaper and other pressures 
that led to the eventual and unusual response by the newspaper of issuing an apology). 
 12 Jon Hyman, Why #BlackLivesMatter Should Matter to Employers, WORKFORCE (July 13, 
2106), http://www.workforce.com/2016/07/13/why-blacklivesmatter-should-matter-to-employers/ 
[https://perma.cc/6CES-7VBR] (describing how the Black Lives Matter movement is fostering more 
discussion of race and leading to more black worker protest to racist or discriminatory messages 
that employers should be prepared to respond to without retaliation under Title VII and without 
violating the concerted activity rights of black employees in protesting, a violation of the NLRA). 
 13 See Elliott Almond, Shades of Ali: Kaepernick Sparked New Wave of Athlete Protest, 
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the public and even a Supreme Court justice for his protest while also 
receiving an award voted on by his co-worker teammates for his cour-
age.14 Kaepernick’s situation, sparked by concerns raised by the Black 
Lives Matter movement, now highlights a new reality regarding how 
comfortable black employees feel about protesting matters of race in the 
workplace. 
This new reality offers key challenges for employers as they decide 
the appropriate response to racism while seeking a productive work-
place. As a result, employers need to know that they may take action 
against an employee’s racially derogatory statements without the limi-
tations created by the NLRB’s decision to protect racist speech. In 2015, 
then-NLRB Member Harry I. Johnson discussed the growing concern 
about the challenges employers face when presented with harassment 
cases arising under the NLRA: 
 We live and work in a civilized society, or at least that is our 
claimed aspiration. The challenge in the modern workplace is to 
bring people of diverse beliefs, backgrounds, and cultures to-
gether to work alongside each other to accomplish shared, pro-
ductive goals. Civility becomes the one common bond that can 
hold us together in these circumstances. Reflecting this under-
lying truth, moreover, legal and ethical obligations make em-
ployers responsible for maintaining safe work environments 
that are free of unlawful harassment. Given all this, employers 
are entitled to expect that employees will coexist treating each 
other with some minimum level of common decency.15 
This Article asserts that employees who utter racist statements 
should be subject to regulation by their employers regardless of whether 
those statements have been uttered in a context where concerns about 
protection of rights under the NLRA may also be present.16 In this Black 
 
MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 27, 2016), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/12/27/2016kap/ [https://per 
ma.cc/J4KQ-V8YU] (describing Kaepernick’s protest). 
 14 Id.; see Tim Kawakami, Colin Kaepernick’s Very Notable Honor, Jed York’s Very Telling 
Comment and the 49ers’ 2017 Housecleaning Set-Up, TALKING POINTS (Dec. 31, 2016), http:// 
blogs.mercurynews.com/kawakami/2016/12/31/kaepernick-baalke/ [https://perma.cc/BBP7-P2JT] 
(describing how Kaepernick’s General Manager was wrong about criticizing Kaepernick for creat-
ing a distraction with his protest and suggesting Kaepernick should not be employed as the quar-
terback and leader of his team when the players resoundingly rejected this narrative by voting to 
give Kaepernick the prestigious Eshmont award for his courage); see also Gene Collier, The Colin 
Kaepernick Saga is Preposterous, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 13, 2017 (describing how 
Kaepernick won an award voted on by his co-workers for “inspirational and courageous play” but 
still cannot find a job as a quarterback because of his protest and not because of his abilities). 
 15 Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688, at *5 (Mar. 31, 2015) (Member 
Johnson, dissenting), enforced, 855 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 16 Only the scope of the disciplinary action taken may be limited to ensure that the employer’s 
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Lives Matter climate where black employees have demanded more re-
sponsiveness to issues of race, employers must face the pressing desire 
for civility and the overall legal and moral need to prevent and respond 
to offensive statements that may create a hostile environment. As a re-
sult, employers have strong incentives to respond to racist statements 
uttered in the workplace. 
Some NLRB decisions have balanced the concerted activity interest 
of employees with other employer interests in ensuring that other em-
ployees are free from harassment, incivility, bullying, and disparage-
ment.17 The NLRB should clearly apply this analysis in all situations 
involving racist utterances. Because some words (such as the N-word) 
are inherently offensive regardless of the context in which the state-
ment was made,18 it is essential that employers be able to address rea-
sonable regulation of those racist utterances in a way that accommo-
dates important efficiency values and concerns about preventing racial 
harassment, while superseding policy reasons or rights-based argu-
ments to allow employees to speak freely. 
In Section II, this Article examines the scope of legal protections 
regarding racist speech under the NLRA. Section II also examines the 
unique perspective of the use of the N-word and other racist utterances 
as a form of speech afforded some protection under the NLRA and the 
 
actions have been consistently applied to statements of all workers and not just those who are also 
asserting rights protected by the NLRA. 
 17 See Arielle A. Dagen-Sunsdahl, Note, Navigating Through Hills & Dales: Can Employers 
Abide by the NLRA While Maintaining Civil Work Environments?, 31 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 363, 
378 (2016) (balancing employer civility policies with rights by the NLRA). Cf. William Beaumont 
Hospital, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 162 (Apr. 3, 2016) (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dis-
senting part) (arguing that an employer’s “legitimate justification” and interests in regulating cer-
tain workplace activities through policies and rules should be balanced with any potentially ad-
verse impact on employee rights protected by the NLRA). Due to the political nature of the NLRB 
and how it is generally accepted that the President may appoint three of its five members from the 
President’s party, there is a legitimate concern that the Board’s position on issues may change 
with a new Republican President after eight years with a Democratic President. See Michael Z. 
Green, The NLRB as an Überagency for the Evolving Workplace, 64 EMORY L.J. 1621, 1627 (2015) 
(describing partisan nature of the appointment of NLRB members). Given the number of dissent-
ing opinions by Republican Board members, such as Harry Johnson and the current acting chair-
man, Phillip Miscimarra, criticizing the Board’s failure to consider an employer’s obligations to 
respond to harassing conduct under Title VII, the Board may soon consider changing its analytical 
approach with respect to the cases discussed herein after President Trump completes his NLRB 
appointments. 
 18 See Alexander Tsesis, The Boundaries of Free Speech, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 141, 145 
(2005) (reviewing the 2004 landmark publication by Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Under-
standing Words that Wound, and suggesting that “[c]alling someone a ‘spic,’, a ‘kike’, or ‘nigger’ 
floods the imagination . . . with insulting ideas about Latinos, Jews, and African Americans” and 
that these terms represent ‘[s]tereotypes that have been communicated repeatedly in diverse social 
contexts” where they “require less information to evoke a whole series of negative connotations”); 
see also Eisenstadt, supra note 2, at 314 (suggesting that some racist speech must be evaluated by 
its context including the “time, place, identity of the parties, and tone of voice”). 
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rationales supporting that protection. Section III highlights the compel-
ling policy interests that make it extremely important for employers to 
be able to regulate racist speech through appropriate regulatory re-
sponses that discipline employees. Section III also establishes a frame-
work for employers to regulate workplace speech that accommodates 
both important policy reasons for allowing employees to speak freely 
and important reasons for employers to take disciplinary action when 
employees utter racist statements, including legal and productivity in-
terests. That accommodating framework can balance these interests by 
adopting retaliation analysis developed under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), which bans employment discrimination 
based upon race, color, sex, national origin and religion.19 In Section IV, 
the Article concludes that the consequences of racist speech, including 
offensiveness that can eventually lead to a hostile racial environment 
for black employees under Title VII, can be handled in a fair and bal-
anced way through analytical changes under the NLRA and a focus on 
broader concerns about creating an environment condoning retaliation 
against black employees who want to challenge or protest racist speech. 
II. BACKGROUND: NLRA RATIONALES FOR LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF 
RACIST WORKPLACE SPEECH 
A. Picket Line Comments: Clear Pines Mouldings Protects Racial 
Epithets and Vulgarities If They Do Not Include Threats 
Section 7 of the NLRA provides: “Employees shall have the right to 
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to en-
gage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection . . .”20 Also, Section 8(a)(1) of the 
NLRA creates an unfair labor practice that can be prosecuted by the 
NLRB if an employer acts “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Section 7].”21 Section 7 
 
 19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a (2012). 
 20 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 21 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012). 
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of the NLRA applies to “all forms of worker activism” whether in a un-
ionized environment or in a workplace with no union,22 while also in-
cluding picketing activity.23 
In its Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc.24 decision, the NLRB found that 
certain misconduct by striking employees on the picket line warrants 
protection as concerted activity.25 Unless their misconduct may reason-
ably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of their Sec-
tion 7 rights and the General Counsel proves that striking employees 
were denied reinstatement for this misconduct, striking employees 
should be reinstated to the positions they held prior to the strike.26 The 
Board in Clear Pine Mouldings further clarified that: “we reject the per 
se rule that words alone can never warrant a denial of reinstatement in 
the absence of physical acts”27 and “the only activity the statute privi-
leges in this context, other than peaceful patrolling, is the nonthreaten-
ing expression of opinion, verbally or through signs and pamphleteer-
ing.”28 
Unfortunately, the NLRB has expanded upon Clear Pine Mould-
ings to find that the utterance of racial epithets by striking employees 
warrants protection.29 First, in the 2004 decision in Detroit Newspa-
pers,30 the initial steps arose that led to the Board’s expanded applica-
tion of Clear Pine Mouldings to cover racist comments when the admin-
istrative law judge found that racist statements by a striking employee 
did not constitute threats and, as a result, the comments were pro-
tected.31 The employee’s statements in Detroit Newspapers included 
saying “[y]ou fuckin’ bitch, nigger lovin’ whore” and “[i]t’s your fault 
that white America lost their jobs.”32 
 
 22 See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: 
Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2024 
(2009) (“Section 7 could be read as providing general anti-retaliation protection for all forms of 
worker activism, so long as the activism is ‘concerted’ and for ‘mutual aid or protection.’”). An 
employer may not retaliate against an employee for exercising the right to engage in protected 
concerted activity. Triangle Elec. Co., 335 N.L.R.B. 1037, 1038 (2001); Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 
N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984). 
 23 Gerold J. Kehoe, Picket Line Misconduct: When Push Comes to Shove are Section 7 Rights 
Lost in the Shuffle?, 58 TEMPLE L.Q. 921 (1985). 
 24 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984), enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 25 268 N.L.R.B. at 1062. 
 26 Id. at 1046. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 1047. 
 29 See, e.g., Airo Die Casting, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B 810, 811–12 (2006). 
 30 342 N.L.R.B. 223 (2004). 
 31 Id. at 268–69. 
 32 Id. at 268. 
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In relying on prior striker misconduct decisions not involving racist 
comments but involving profanity and “vile language and/or gestures, 
standing alone” that did not constitute forfeiture of rights because there 
was no threat, the administrative law judge in Detroit Newspapers 
found: “While there is no doubt what [the employee] said . . . was clearly 
offensive and reprehensible under any objective standard, it does not 
constitute grounds for discharge under Clear Pine Mouldings.”33 Alt-
hough it appears that Detroit Newspapers was the first key case where 
the use of racial epithets, not just profanity, was at issue, the Board did 
not specifically address or adopt the administrative law judge’s analysis 
about the racial epithet being protected. The individual case, involving 
the charges related to the employee making those racist statements and 
the subsequent disciplinary action being challenged pertaining to that 
employee, settled after the administrative law judge’s decision and it 
was not one of the charges considered by the Board in its final decision 
in Detroit Newspapers.34 
Nevertheless, the Board specifically expanded the Clear Pine 
Mouldings analysis to include racial epithets and racist statements in 
its 2006 decision in Airo Die Casting, Inc.35 In Airo Die Casting, the 
Board affirmed the administrative law judge’s finding that the em-
ployer committed an unfair labor practice after the judge determined 
that a picketer’s racial slur, “‘fuck you nigger,’” standing alone, did not 
constitute a threat and was protected.36 The Airo Die Casting adminis-
trative law judge cited the Board’s Detroit Newspapers decision for sup-
port despite the fact that the Board in Detroit Newspapers never 
adopted the rationale of the Detroit Newspapers administrative law 
judge decision regarding the application of racial epithets under Clear 
Pine Mouldings.37 The administrative law judge in Airo Die Casting also 
cited Nickell Moulding38 in support of the decision, which involved the 
use of profanity, absent any racial epithets, and was subsequently re-
versed.39 
Furthermore, two out of the three members involved in the Board 
decision in Airo Die Casting signaled a possible change to the Board’s 
analysis when considering an employee’s use of racial epithets, like the 
 
 33 Id. at 269. 
 34 Id. at 223–24 & n.4. 
 35 347 N.L.R.B. 810 (2006). 
 36 Id. at 812. 
 37 Id. (“[T]he Board has found that a striker’s use of the most vile and vulgar language, in-
cluding racial epithets, does not deprive him of the protection of the Act, so long as those actions 
do not constitute a threat.”) (citing Detroit Newspapers, 242 N.L.R.B. 223 (2004)). 
 38 317 N.L.R.B. 826 (1995), rev’d, NMC Finishing v. NLRB, 101 F.3d 528, 530 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 39 101 F.3d at 530. 
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N-word, under the Clear Pine Mouldings standard. Specifically, Mem-
bers Schaumber and Kirsanow noted in Airo Die Casting that although 
they agreed with the administrative law judge’s findings in the case, 
they also believed that “there may well be circumstances, absent here, 
in which a picketing employee’s use of the word ‘nigger’ might cause the 
employee to lose the Act’s protection, even in the absence of violence or 
explicit threats of violence.”40 In considering an employee’s utterance of 
the N-word, Republican Board Members Schaumber and Kirsanow sug-
gested that “under the right (or wrong) circumstances, the word itself 
may be so incendiary as to constitute an implied threat or an incitement 
to violence.”41 
For several years, Airo Die Casting appeared to be the only Board 
decision that seemed to support the protection of racist statements on 
the picket line as an extension of Clear Pine Mouldings, despite its di-
vided reasoning about racist utterances and its reliance on an adminis-
trative law decision in Detroit Newspapers as concrete precedent when 
the Board never addressed the issue due to a settlement. In its most 
recent decision on the subject in 2016, the NLRB has continued to ex-
pand its application of Clear Pine Mouldings to protect striker miscon-
duct involving racist speech while ignoring broader concerns about an 
employer’s need to address racial harassment of its black workers. 
In Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.,42 an NLRB administrative law judge 
found that an employee’s alleged racist comments while on the picket 
line during a lockout constituted protected activity under the NLRA.43 
The employee, Runion, while acting as a member of a picket line, yelled 
out toward black replacement workers who crossed the picket line to 
enter the workplace: “Hey, did you bring enough KFC for everyone?” 
and “Hey, anybody smell that? I smell fried chicken and watermelon.”44 
These comments were captured on videotape by one of the employer’s 
security guards.45 Although the employee admitted that he made the 
KFC statement, he did not agree that he made the chicken and water-
melon statement.46 
The employer terminated Runion for making these statements 
while on the picket line. After the termination, a grievance was filed by 
Runion’s union and the dispute went to an arbitrator. The arbitrator 
 
 40 347 N.L.R.B. 810, 810 n.1 (2006). 
 41 Id. 
 42 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194, 2016 WL 2894792 (May 17, 2016), enforced, 866 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 
2017) 
 43 Id. at *2. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
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decided that the employee had uttered both statements and upheld the 
termination as made by the employer with just cause due to the em-
ployee’s serious misconduct in saying the statements and conveying the 
statements in the picket line context, which could have incited vio-
lence.47 The union asked the Board not to defer to the arbitration deci-
sion and to consider the union’s charge of an unfair labor practice.48 The 
NLRB filed an unfair labor practice complaint and alleged that while 
the racist comments could be considered offensive, they were insuffi-
cient to warrant termination of the employee.49 
Specifically, the NLRB’s General Counsel asserted that pursuant 
to established Board precedent in Airo Die Casting50 and Detroit News-
papers,51 the “racially charged statements did not tend to coerce or in-
timidate employees in their Section 7 rights because they were not ac-
companied by threats or aggressive behavior.”52 The situation and the 
comments in Airo Die Casting were similar to the facts in Cooper Tire; 
however, the Airo Die Casting comments included even stronger racial 
language as an employee on the picket line approached both cars cross-
ing the picket line and an African American security guard and yelled 
with both his middle fingers extended: “‘[F]uck you nigger.’”53 In Airo 
Die Casting, the Board found that the employee’s activity was protected 
as long as it was not a threat.54 The comments in Detroit Newspapers 
included “racial epithets such as ‘you fuckin’ bitch, nigger lovin’ whore,’” 
which were deemed protected statements under the NLRA by the ad-
ministrative law judge as long as they did not constitute threats, alt-
hough the unfair labor practice charges regarding this matter were set-
tled and not considered by the Board in its final decision.55 
The Board in Cooper Tire affirmed the administrative law judge’s 
decision while also refusing to consider the administrative law judge’s 
discussion of Detroit Newspapers as persuasive because the Board never 
considered the racist language in Detroit Newspapers.56 In the Cooper 
 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 347 N.L.R.B. 810 (2006). 
 51 342 N.L.R.B. 223 (2004). 
 52 Cooper Tire, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194, 2016 WL 2894792, at *2 (administrative law judge deci-
sion describing the contentions of the parties). 
 53 Airo Die Casting, 347 N.L.R.B. at 811. 
 54 Id. at 810 n.3 (affirming administrative law judge decision finding at 347 N.L.R.B at 811–
12). 
 55 Cooper Tire, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194, 2016 WL 2894792, at *2 n.11 (administrative law deci-
sion referring to Detroit Newspapers, 342 N.L.R.B. at 223–24). 
 56 Id. at *1 n.1 (“Finally, in adopting the judge’s findings, we do not rely on his citations to the 
administrative law judge’s decisions in Detroit Newspapers, 342 N.L.R.B. 223, 268–69 (2004) and 
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Tire decision, the Board noted that it was appropriate not to defer to 
the arbitrator’s decision. Specifically, the arbitrator’s finding conflicted 
with the Board’s standard in Clear Pine Mouldings by concluding the 
employee’s conduct was even more serious because it occurred on a 
picket line.57 
What is somewhat interesting is that the Board in Cooper Tire dis-
tinguished the result from its 1955 decision, Spielberg Manufacturing 
Co.,58 where four striking employees were found to have engaged in un-
protected activity on the picket line and were lawfully refused reinstate-
ment when “they persistently shouted profane insults, including racist 
slurs, at individuals over several days of picketing.”59 According to the 
Board in Cooper Tire, the conduct in Spielberg was “distinguishable 
from the instant case on its facts.”60 This finding suggests that the 
Board distinguished the two racial slurs made by Runion in Cooper Tire 
from the four striking employees in Spielberg because their racial slurs 
were made over a longer period of time and directly to individual em-
ployees. Also, the Board found it important that Runion’s statements in 
Cooper Tire were only “made about replacement workers after a closed 
van carrying those workers had passed.”61 
Here is where the Board’s slavish and narrow adherence to the 
Clear Pine Mouldings standard has gone awry given the realities of our 
heightened Black Lives Matter climate in the workplace. The Board 
tends to assume that the use of racist statements on the picket line, per 
se, does not coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. 
However, as the arbitrator in Cooper Tire indicated, any African-Amer-
ican employee who was the object of the race-related comments made 
by Runion would consider the comments “disrespectful of [their] dig-
nity.”62 Also, by protecting the comments at issue and not deferring to 
 
Wayne Stead Cadillac, 303 N.L.R.B. 432, 436 (1991), which the judge found ‘persuasive’ but had 
not been subject to Board review.”). 
 57 Id. (“We agree with the judge that deferral is inappropriate based on his conclusion that the 
arbitrator’s decision was ‘clearly repugnant’ to the Act, including on the ground that the arbitra-
tor’s statement that employee Anthony Runion’s conduct was ‘even more serious’ because it oc-
curred on a picket line is contrary to the Board’s standard for evaluating picket-line misconduct 
under Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 NLRB 1044, 1046 (1984), enforced, 765 F2d. 148 (9th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986). However, we do not rely on the parts of the judge’s rationale 
that can be read to find that the arbitrator failed to adequately consider the unfair labor practice 
issue.”). 
 58 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). 
 59 Cooper Tire, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194, 2016 WL 2894792, at *1 n.1 (citing Spielberg, 112 
N.L.R.B. at 1082 & n.6). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at *2. 
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the decision of the arbitrator, the Board seemed to countenance an en-
vironment where even more racist statements would transpire and 
more potential for violence could occur.63 
What the Board fails to consider in its analysis is how such racist 
statements can coerce those African American employees exercising 
their Section 7 rights. Would not most African-American employees feel 
uncomfortable about striking workers who they may have to work side 
by side with when the strike is over if those striking workers were so 
readily willing to use racist statements and racial epithets while on the 
picket line? By the very nature of uttering the racist speech, are not the 
striking employees trying to coerce the black workers into not continu-
ing to work with them? Otherwise, why use racist speech in the first 
instance? Even if the Board has the audacity to continue finding that 
racist statements made while on the picket line should be protected un-
less they rise to the level of a threat or coercion of Section 7 rights under 
Clear Pine Mouldings, the Board should, at a minimum, reconsider how 
racist statements can coerce employees in the use of their Section 7 
rights and should not condone racist statements under any standard 
the Board uses. 
Bloggers have commented about the Hobson’s choice that employ-
ers may face based upon Cooper Tire.64 As long as the racist statements 
are not threats and were part of activity pursued on behalf of Section 7 
activity, the speech will be protected and employer disciplinary actions 
would violate the NLRA. However, failing to take disciplinary action 
could subject the employer to liability for racial discrimination claims. 
Given that the NLRB approved the administrative law judge’s findings 
in Cooper Tire on May 17, 2016, it is unlikely that the current members 
from the 2016 Board will change their analysis, especially since it ap-
pears to be consistent with the Board’s earlier decision in Airo Die Cast-
ing.65 Russell L. Samson, a management attorney, has recommended 
that employers: 
 
 63 Id. at *2 n.5 (describing how an unidentified person used the N-word on the picket line after 
Runion left). 
 64 Thomas T. Hearn, NLRB Rules that Racism Is a Protected Activity, HR LEGALIST (June 24, 
2015), http://www.hrlegalist.com/2015/06/nlrb-rules-that-racism-is-a-protected-activity/ [https:// 
perma.cc/524N-7Z7S]; Jillian Kay Melchor, The NLRB Sides with Despicably Racist Union Work-
ers over Their Employer, NATIONAL REVIEW (June 15, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/arti 
cle/419745/nlrb-sides-despicably-racist-union-workers-over-their-employer-jillian-kay-melchior [h 
ttps://perma.cc/RR9F-5ARQ]; Russell L. Samson, Title VII vs. NLRA on the Picket Line: Employers 
in a Quandary, DICKINSON IOWA EMPLOYER LAW BLOG (June 25, 2015), http://www.dickin 
sonlaw.com/2015/06/title-vii-vs-nlra-picket-line-employers-quandary/ [https://perma.cc/MA5U-3U 
NX]; Christian Schappel, One Unbelievable NLRB Ruling: Racist Comments Protected, HR 
MORNING (June 12, 2015), http://www.hrmorning.com/unbelievable-nlrb-ruling-racist-comments-
protected/ [https://perma.cc/P9AY-HZ6X]. 
 65 The employer in Cooper Tire challenged the Board’s decision to the United States Court of 
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should favor the broader societal policy expressed in the general 
discrimination laws as amplified by the courts: Adopt, adhere to, 
and enforce a “no harassment” policy to teach bigots that “ex-
pressing their opinions in a way that abuses or offends their co-
worker will not be tolerated.” If there is going to be an imprima-
tur on such conduct, let it be done by some outside entity.66 
Some courts have started to reject the NLRB’s approach. In NMC 
Finishing v. NLRB67 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit found that a female striker’s display of a picket sign, “Who is 
Rhonda F [with an X through the F] Sucking today?” was not protected 
activity and refused to enforce the Board’s decision that the activity was 
protected by the Act.68 Additionally, in Media General Operations, Inc., 
d/b/a The Tampa Tribune,69 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit reversed the Board and found that an employee lost the 
Act’s protection when he called the employer’s vice president a “‘stupid 
fucking moron’” while criticizing the vice president’s mailings and bar-
gaining tactics even though the employee later apologized.70 These 
cases, while not even involving examples of hideous racist statements, 
do establish that some federal courts have reversed the NLRB’s expan-
sive protection of offensive speech. 
Finally and most recently, Judge Millett, of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, wrote a concur-
ring opinion in Consolidated Communications Inc. v. NLRB71 that 
called the Board to task for its stilted approach to addressing the use of 
vulgarity and racial epithets through the prism of the Clear Pine 
 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; the decision in that Court was still pending at the time this Article 
was submitted. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Equal Employment Advisory Council, 2016 WL 
5122576 (Sept. 6, 2016); Brief for Intervenor Union, 2016 WL 6694581 (Nov. 9, 2016); Brief for the 
NLRB, 2016 WL 6694582 (Nov. 10, 2016); Reply Brief for Petitioner/Cross Respondent, 2016 WL 
7335072 (Dec. 9, 2016). While this Article was going through final edits, the Eighth Circuit issued 
a decision affirming the decision of the NLRB. See Cooper Tire & Rubber Co, v. NLRB, 866 F.3d 
885 (2017). A dissenting opinion to the 2 to 1 decision criticized the Board and the court majority’s 
deference to prior Board decisions while noting that “[n]o employer in America is or can be required 
to employ a racial bigot.” Id. at 894 (J. Beam, dissenting). The final resolution of this matter is 
unclear as the Employer has petitioned for a rehearing en banc with the Eighth Circuit and further 
decisions may arise. Also, with a new Republican president, Donald Trump, the make-up of the 
NLRB is likely to change. The current sole Republican Member who was on the 2016 Obama Board 
and did not participate in the Cooper Tire decision, Philip Miscimarra, is now the acting chairman 
and will eventually become part of the NLRB’s majority called upon to assess further application 
of the Clear Pine Mouldings doctrine. 
 66 Samson, supra note 64. 
 67 101 F.3d 528, 530 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’g Nickell Moulding, 317 N.L.R.B. 826 (1995). 
 68 Id. 
 69 560 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 2009), denying enforcement, 351 N.L.R.B. 1324 (2007). 
 70 Id. 
 71 837 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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Mouldings standard.72 Specifically, Judge Millett first concluded in the 
majority opinion that the employee’s behavior of grabbing his crotch 
and making an obscene gesture towards a female, non-striking em-
ployee was protected as part of “the rough-and-tumble nature of picket 
lines.”73 The court also noted that the Board had incorrectly limited its 
analysis to whether the misconduct was violent instead of asking 
whether the striking employee’s misconduct may “reasonably tend to 
coerce or intimidate” employees under the Clear Pine Mouldings re-
quirement.74 
In the concurring opinion, Judge Millett noted that her reasons for 
writing a separate opinion were to “convey [her] substantial concern 
with the too-often cavalier and enabling approach that the Board’s de-
cisions have taken toward the sexually and racially demeaning miscon-
duct of some employees during strikes.”75 Judge Millett’s evident frus-
tration was based upon Board decisions she believed had “repeatedly 
given refuge to conduct that is not only intolerable by any standard of 
decency, but also illegal in every other corner of the workplace,” includ-
ing “sexually and racially disparaging conduct that Board decisions 
have winked away.”76 From her perspective, the Board’s analysis has 
failed to address “the very types of demeaning and degrading messages 
that for too much of our history have trapped women and minorities in 
a second-class workplace status.”77 Although Judge Millett questions 
several cases involving sexist statements, the “racially derogatory and 
demeaning epithets and behavior” protected by the Airo Die Casting 
and Cooper Tire decisions also fall within the specific ire trumpeted by 
her concurring opinion.78 Judge Millett captures the overall concern of 
this Article by asking “how on earth can calling an African-American 
worker ‘nigger’ be a tolerated mode of communicating worker griev-
ances?”79 
 
 72 Id. at 20–24 (Millett, J., concurring). 
 73 Id. at 12 (majority opinion). Judge Millett authored both the majority opinion and the con-
curring opinion in this case. See id. at 5–20 (majority opinion) and 20–24 (concurring opinion). 
 74 Id. at 18. 
 75 Id. at 20 (Millett, J., concurring). 
 76 Id. at 20–21. 
 77 Id. at 21. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 22. 
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B. Employee Outbursts: Atlantic Steel Protects Use of Harassing 
Vulgarities 
An employee engaged in protected activity under Section 7 of the 
NLRA “can, by opprobrious conduct, lose the protection of the Act.”80 
Under the Board’s Atlantic Steel test, four factors must be weighed in 
assessing whether an employee’s speech is protected by the NLRA or is 
instead subject to disciplinary action by the employer: “(1) the place of 
the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of 
the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way, 
provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice.”81 “The Atlantic Steel 
standard attempts to balance the employer’s interest in an orderly work 
environment with the employee’s right to engage in concerted activ-
ity.”82 However, under this standard, employees may use sarcasm along 
with obnoxious language, including cursing and calling a supervisor un-
pleasant names.83 
The question of whether this protection of Section 7 activity under 
the opprobrious standard comes at the expense of protections from har-
assment under Title VII has represented a longstanding concern.84 In 
1991, Professor Peter Millspaugh questioned whether Section 7 activity 
under the NLRA should supersede protections under Title VII with re-
spect to racial harassment in the workplace.85 Millspaugh discussed the 
Board’s 1988 Arthur Young & Co. decision where employees engaged in 
concerted activity also made racial and ethnic slurs regarding blacks 
and Puerto Ricans.86 The administrative law judge found that the al-
leged racial slurs did not include those “typically offensive ways of de-
scribing blacks or Puerto Ricans.”87 
The administrative law judge in Arthur Young also noted that the 
employer asserted that if it had not discharged the employees involved 
for their use of racial slurs, the employer would have been subject to 
potential liability under Title VII.88 Nevertheless, the administrative 
 
 80 See Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Elizabeth Allen, Note, You Can’t Say That on Facebook: The NLRA’s Opprobriousness 
Standard and Social Media, 45 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 195, 207 (2014); see also Susan D. Carle, 
Angry Employees: Revisiting Insubordination in Title VII Cases, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 185, 
218–21 (2016) (describing the Atlantic Steel doctrine). 
 83 Allen, supra note 82, at 207 (citing Board decisions). 
 84 See Peter E. Millspaugh, When Self-Organization Includes Racial Harassment: Must the 
NLRA Yield to Title VII?, 2 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 12–13 (1991). 
 85 Id. at 14. 
 86 See Arthur Young & Co., 291 N.L.R.B. 39, 44 (1988). 
 87 Id. at 44 n.11. 
 88 Id. at 44 n.13. 
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law judge rejected this argument by stating this “assertion goes far be-
yond what the facts in this case could conceivably justify” because an 
“occasional ethnic slur” is not actionable as it does not reach the level 
of “derogatory comments . . . so excessive and opprobrious as to consti-
tute an unlawful practice under Title VII.”89 
This finding creates a dilemma for employers. Only comments that 
are so severe and pervasive that they create hostile environment liabil-
ity will be exempt from NLRB protection if made as part of concerted 
activity. However, an employer’s choice to do nothing when offensive 
speech is conveyed could still create hostile environment liability under 
Title VII. This inaction also sends a chilling and retaliatory message to 
black employees that any protests to the use of racial slurs, when 
couched with concerted activity, will be ignored by the employer. But, if 
the employer takes disciplinary action, that discipline can represent an 
unfair labor practice in coercing employees in the exercise of their Sec-
tion 7 rights under the NLRA. 
Although the Board’s application of Atlantic Steel allows profane 
comments, the Board has not clearly applied the Atlantic Steel factors 
to protect the use of racial epithets. However, the Board’s application of 
Atlantic Steel does suggest broad acceptance of offensive speech as be-
ing protected by the NLRA. In its most recent application of the Atlantic 
Steel test in 2014’s Plaza Auto Center, Inc.,90 which came to the Board 
on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the Board was required to reapply the four-factor Atlantic Steel 
test to determine whether an employee’s outburst during protected ac-
tivity caused the loss of protection under the Act.91 
The Board had to determine the nature of the outburst, whether it 
involved obscene remarks that constituted insubordination, or whether 
it was also menacing, physically aggressive, or belligerent.92 The spe-
cific incident involved an employee who lost his temper after discussing 
working conditions with his supervisor, calling the supervisor a “‘fuck-
ing mother fucking,’ a ‘fucking crook,’ and an ‘asshole’” who was stupid 
as “nobody liked him and, everyone talked about him behind his back.”93 
The Board held that the employee did not engage in menacing, physi-
cally aggressive, or belligerent conduct and as a result his speech was 
 
 89 Id. 
 90 360 N.L.R.B. 972, 979 (2014) (holding that the employee retained the protection of the Act 
despite his outburst as the Act protects his right to engage in Section 7 activity without unduly 
impairing the employer’s legitimate interest in maintaining order and discipline in the workplace). 
 91 Id. at 972. 
 92 Id. at 974. 
 93 Id. 
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considered protected Section 7 activity.94 In a dissenting opinion, Mem-
ber Harry Johnson argued: “The holding here that a profane, sustained, 
ad hominem attack on a senior manager in the work force must be tol-
erated because of the connection to Section 7 activity unnecessarily im-
pedes employers’ ability to deal with such conduct if engaged in by one 
worker against another.”95 
In another decision, Pier Sixty, LLC,96 an employee, upset with his 
supervisor about how the supervisor addressed him during an organiz-
ing campaign, used his iPhone during a break to post the following com-
ment about his supervisor on Facebook: “Bob is such a NASTY 
MOTHER FUCKER don’t know how to talk to people!!!!!! Fuck his 
mother and his entire fucking family!!!! What a LOSER!!!! Vote YES for 
the UNION!!!!!!!”97 The Board found that this statement was protected 
Section 7 activity as the opprobriousness of the statement did not out-
weigh the other factors involved, including the employer’s anti-union 
hostility, the provocation and impulse of the employee, the subject mat-
ter, the limiting of the communication to the employee’s Facebook 
friends, the nature of the post, the use of similar language by the em-
ployer, and the lack of a policy that prohibits such language.98 
Again, Member Johnson wrote a rather passionate dissent in which 
he especially criticized the language the employee used attacking his 
supervisor’s family and the Board’s allowance of such.99 Member John-
son first stated that under the totality of the circumstances it was quite 
appropriate for Pier Sixty to discipline the employee, Perez.100 He then 
stated: 
In condoning Perez’ offensive online rant, which was fraught 
with insulting and obscene vulgarities directed toward his man-
ager and his manager’s mother and family, my colleagues recast 
an outrageous, individualized griping episode as protected activ-
ity. I cannot join in concluding that such blatantly uncivil and 
opprobrious behavior is within the Act’s protection.101 
 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 982 (Member Johnson, dissenting) (citing Kerri Lynn Stone, Floor to Ceiling: How 
Setbacks and Challenges to the Anti-Bullying Movement Pose Challenges to Employers Who Wish 
to Ban Bullying, 22 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 355 (2013)). 
 96 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688 (Mar. 31, 2015). 
 97 Id. at *2. 
 98 Id. at *5. 
 99 Id. at *5 (Member Johnson, dissenting). 
 100 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688, at *5 (Mar. 31, 2015). 
 101 Id. 
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Member Johnson argued that Perez’s statements were, in fact, 
“qualitatively different” than statements other employees had used and 
were tolerated by Pier Sixty.102 According to Member Johnson, the com-
ments directed at the supervisor’s family were “over the top” and were 
not deserving of the Act’s protection.103 The comments were “personally 
offensive” and were broadcast to a much broader audience than employ-
ees cursing at one another in the workplace.104 
On the other side of the equation are cases that have started to 
suggest that employee misconduct involving offensive statements may 
result in unprotected conduct despite the Atlantic Steel factors. For ex-
ample, in Fresenius USA Manufacturing, Inc.,105 the Board revisited a 
prior case that had been overturned due to a lack of the proper number 
of Board members.106 The prior 2012 decision in Fresenius107 held that 
the employee’s improper and vulgar behavior in using the word “pussy” 
during the course of otherwise concerted activity was protected.108 Spe-
cifically, the employee anonymously wrote statements on union news-
letters left in the employee breakroom in an attempt to support the un-
ion during a decertification election including stating “‘Dear Pussies, 
Please Read!’”109 The Board found that he did not forfeit the NLRA pro-
tection despite a sexual harassment complaint.110 In revisiting the 2012 
decision with a properly constituted number of Board members in 2015, 
the Board, without disavowing the earlier finding that the employee’s 
handwritten remarks were protected, noted the importance of the em-
ployer’s Title VII interest in investigating the conduct and reached a 
different result from its prior decision.111 Ultimately the Board sus-
tained the employer’s discharge of the employee because the employee 
had lied during the course of the employer’s investigation.112 
 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160 (June 24, 2015). 
 106 Id. at *2–3. 
 107 Fresenius USA Mfg. Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. 1261 (2012) (applying the Atlantic Steel factors to 
assess whether an employee’s conduct should be protected after female employees objected to the 
language pursuant to Title VII; however, the decision involved recess appointment Board members 
who were eventually found to be unconstitutionally appointed), vacated and remanded, No. 12-
1387 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 108 Id. at 1266. 
 109 Id. at 1261, 1265. 
 110 Id. at 1266, 1267–68. 
 111 362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160, at *2–3. 
 112 Id. 
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III. ACCOMMODATING EMPLOYER REGULATION OF RACIST SPEECH 
THROUGH TITLE VII RETALIATION AND CIVILITY ANALYSIS IN FUTURE 
NLRB DECISIONS 
To the extent the Board continues to address racist statements 
made by employees in the workplace, it must acknowledge the im-
portant policy reasons why employers must be allowed to take discipli-
nary action when such statements occur. Under the Board’s current 
analysis, an employee can say almost anything without punishment.113 
Employers have obligations under Title VII to respond to racist state-
ments by employees as mechanism to prevent liability for racial harass-
ment.114 However, a “‘mere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders 
offensive feelings . . . ’ does not sufficiently affect the conditions of em-
ployment to implicate Title VII.”115 But an employer may be liable for 
harassment under Title VII “if it knew or should have known about the 
conduct and failed to stop it” as it reached the level of being severe and 
pervasive to establish a hostile environment.116 As a result, employers 
are faced with the Hobson’s choice of being found liable under Title VII 
for failing to address racist statements in the workplace versus being 
found liable for unfair labor practices when taking action against an 
employee for racist statements found to be protected under the NLRA. 
Strong policy reasons pursuant to Section 7 of the NLRA and its 
protection of concerted activity by employees may suggest some support 
for protecting speech uttered in the workplace even if it is offensive. In 
an adversarial setting where emotions and passions reach a fever pitch, 
the Board has found that it is better to err on the side of protecting 
workers who may impulsively and roughly say bad language to replace-
ment workers or their supervisors.117 Certainly, opportunistic employ-
ers, ready to violate the NLRA by terminating employees for exercising 
Section 7 rights, may rush to judgment regarding the assessment of dis-
cipline for impulsive comments made in the heat of the moment and 
 
 113 This inappropriate and narrowing approach of only considering whether the speech is a 
threat is not limited to just racist speech. See Wayne Stead Cadillac, 303 N.L.R.B. 432, 436 (1991) 
(administrative law judge finding a striking employee’s statements were protected when the em-
ployee grabbed his testicles and gyrated his hips back and forth while yelling “fuck you” towards 
a nonemployee and the nonemployee’s 8-year-old daughter who were in their car attempting to 
leave the employer’s premises). 
 114 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (describing how an employer 
may have a defense to a harassment claim by establishing “that the employer exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and correct promptly any . . . harassing behavior”). 
 115 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). Also, “‘simple teasing’ [or] offhand comments” do not establish a 
claim of harassment under Title VII. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. 
 116 See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998). 
 117 See Allied Indus. Workers Local 289, 476 F.2d 868, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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part of the “rough-and-tumble” environment that the Board accepts by 
its policies aimed at protecting legitimate Section 7 activity.118 The 
Board, in its expertise, has weighed this balance in favor of allowing 
offensive speech for employees in the heat of the moment as long as the 
comments do not rise to the level of being threatening or physical.119 
In identifying the policy reasons for allowing such offensive speech 
when compared with the policy reasons for banning harassment, bully-
ing, and unproductive workplace speech, there are both legal and prag-
matic considerations for employers and employees offended by such 
speech.120 However, as Professor Dianne Avery had noted back in 1993, 
protection of certain offensive language by the NLRB seems to condone 
as appropriate an anachronistic form of workplace “behavior in the 
‘rough and tumble’ of labor activity.”121 At this stage in the development 
of workplace law and legitimate employer concerns regarding the pre-
vention of harassment and bullying based upon offensive language be-
ing used, the time has come for the NLRB to consider the burdens on 
employers who must respond when faced with evidence of racist com-
ments being aimed at employees. Furthermore, the Board must shift its 
focus to the employees subjected to the racist comments and the effect 
on their ability to exercise their Section 7 rights in light of the language 
being allowed by the Board as being protected. 
While acknowledging that the Board cannot justify its analysis in 
allowing striking employees the protection to signal to other employees 
that racist statements are necessary to convey their concerns while on 
the picket line, Judge Millett’s concurring opinion in Consolidated Com-
munications offers two suggestions that should be considered by the 
Board before it decides to continue its protection of racist speech. First, 
the opinion notes that the Board’s analysis appears to focus on the per-
spective of the perpetrator rather than the victim when assessing 
whether the statements made are a threat or coercive.122 Second, the 
opinion highlights the Board’s failure to consider how the racist state-
ments may have an effect beyond the picket line when a black employee 
“has seen the darkest thoughts of a co-worker revealed in a deliberately 
 
 118 See Consolidated Communications, 837 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Allied, 476 F.2d 
at 879). 
 119 See Briar Crest Nursing Home, 333 N.L.R.B. 935, 947 (2001). 
 120 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Dis-
criminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 753–59 (1997). 
 121 See Dianne Avery, Gender Stereotypes, Picket Line Violence, and the “Law” of Strike Mis-
conduct Cases, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 251, 274 (1993). 
 122 837 F.3d at 23 (Millett, J., concurring). 
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humiliating tirade” and may not “feel truly equal or safe working along-
side that employee again.”123 
Some “[r]esearch studies show that workplace morale, as well as 
individual employees’ psyche, productivity, and mental health, are all 
threatened by abusive, discriminatory workplace speech.”124 Black em-
ployees—more than any other racial or ethnic group—are likely to ex-
perience frequent discrimination and report symptoms of depression as 
a result of that discrimination.125 Also, Professor Kerry Stone has ex-
plained: “when group members . . . have their complaints ignored, this 
disregard may be read as corporate ratification of the unlawful behav-
ior.”126 As a result, employers have a strong justification to change the 
analysis that leaves them helpless to respond when employees have ut-
tered racist, sexist, and vulgar statements with impunity based on pro-
tection under the NLRA. 
At a minimum, and without making a major change, the Board 
should reverse its Airo Die Casting and Cooper Tire decisions. Then the 
Board should also consider the thoughtful concerns of Members 
Schaumber and Kirsanow expressed in Airo Die Casting regarding how 
the use of the N-word could result in loss of protection under the NLRA 
even without the presence of a threat or violence.127 To that end, the 
Board should view racist statements by employees similar to the state-
ments in Airo Die Casting and Cooper Tire as having a tendency to co-
erce fellow black employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. This 
is not a huge step for the NLRB, which considers inflammatory appeals 
based upon race during an election campaign to be improper.128 
Instead of looking like a federal agency that is willing to protect 
racist speech, the Board should start with the premise that racist 
speech does not receive protection under the NLRA as concerted activ-
ity.129 However, when looking at the disciplinary action taken in re-
 
 123 Id. at 24. 
 124 Kerri Lynn Stone, Decoding Civility, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 185, 213 (2013). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 221. 
 127 347 N.L.R.B. 810, 810 n.1 (2006) (noting “there may well be circumstances . . . in which a 
picketing employee’s use of the word ‘nigger’ might cause the employee to lose the Act’s protection, 
even in the absence of violence or explicit threats of violence”). 
 128 See Sewell Manufacturing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71–72 (1962) (identifying election campaign 
appeals to racial prejudice that are not germane are inappropriate and finding that such appeals 
warrant setting aside any NLRB election results). 
 129 This Article recognizes that the political and partisan nature of the NLRB could help a 
newly-constituted Republican Board in pursuing the changes suggested herein to overrule Airo 
Die Casting based on the opinions of the Republican NLRB members in that case. See Green, supra 
note 17, at 1644 (describing how the NLRB’s analysis has been criticized as political in that it 
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sponse to this racist speech, the employer must not act in a discrimina-
tory manner by taking harsher actions for those employees also in-
volved in Section 7 activity. As in Cooper Tire, if other employees in-
volved in much more drastic behavior received lesser sanctions, or no 
sanctions, when compared with the employees involved in uttering the 
racist speech, then this discriminatory treatment under the NLRA may 
protect those employees despite their racist comments. 
Without having to reach the legal standard of actionable harass-
ment, employers should have the right to regulate employee speech that 
involves the utterance of racially-charged language. Because utterance 
of racial epithets in the workplace requires severe and pervasive situa-
tions to foster a hostile environment, Title VII may not adequately ad-
dress basic issues before they reach that level. Nevertheless, basic no-
tions of civility and prevention of bullying and harassment in the 
workplace as a tool for productivity and sufficiency represent legitimate 
reasons for an employer’s disciplinary actions.130 Title VII cases consist-
ently state that antidiscrimination law does not operate as a civility 
code “designed to rid the workplace of vulgarity.”131 However, basic in-
civility creates a major financial problem for employers. Christine Po-
rath and Christine Pearson have documented the significant financial 
costs that employers undertake as a result of incivility: 
The costs chip away at the bottom line. Nearly everybody who 
experiences workplace incivility responds in a negative way, in 
some cases overtly retaliating. Employees are less creative when 
they feel disrespected, and many get fed up and leave. About half 
deliberately decrease their effort or lower the quality of their 
 
changes “from one administration to the next”). Also, the prospect of seeking a legislative resolu-
tion to address racist speech through changes to the NLRA is unlikely as repeated attempts to 
amend that statute in Congress have primarily failed for more than forty years. Id. at 1625 n.9 
(describing the difficulty in obtaining legislative reform regarding the NLRA) (citing Richard D. 
Kahlenberg & Moshe Z. Marvit, “Architects of Democracy”: Labor Organizing as a Civil Right, 9 
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213, 221–29, 231−36 (2013)). 
 130 See Stone, supra note 124, at 223–26. 
 131 See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 38 Cal. 4th 264, 295 (2006). Although outside 
the scope of this Article, there are some situations where employees may use racist speech, includ-
ing the N-word, when it is not directed at a particular employee and the context may suggest that 
the employee who uttered those words was not appreciating the racial implications of the speech. 
See Eisenstadt, supra note 2, at 314 (arguing that “linguistic meaning, particularly of derogatory 
terms, is a complex phenomenon that results from a multitude of contextual factors . . . [and] 
include time, place, identity of the parties, and tone of voice”). Professor Leora Eisenstadt has 
raised this concern and suggested that the racial identity of the speaker as an outsider or insider 
of the racial group at issue should be considered in some context—possibly through expert testi-
mony to help a jury understand the use of certain speech deemed racist and how an employer 
should respond to it. Id. at 306, 335–42. Eisenstadt also notes that there are weaknesses in her 
suggestion including potential inconsistency. Id. at 348. 
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work. And incivility damages customer relationships. Our re-
search shows that people are less likely to buy from a company 
with an employee they perceive as rude, whether the rudeness 
is directed at them or at other employees. Witnessing just a sin-
gle unpleasant interaction leads customers to generalize about 
other employees, the organization, and even the brand. . . . And 
we’ve collected data from more than 14,000 people throughout 
the United States and Canada in order to track the prevalence, 
types, causes, costs, and cures of incivility at work. We know two 
things for certain: Incivility is expensive, and few organizations 
recognize or take action to curtail it.132 
As the Pickering test under First Amendment jurisprudence clearly 
establishes, employers should be able to regulate worker speech 
through disciplinary action aimed at an employer’s need to promote the 
efficiency of its services, which outweighs the employee’s speech inter-
ests.133 When looking at the overall efficiencies and costs related to in-
civility in the workplace, an employer has a strong, compelling interest 
to take disciplinary action based on racist speech that is independent of 
but in conjunction with any desire to comply with Title VII’s anti-har-
assment laws. 
Because the failure to respond to racist statements can deter a rea-
sonable employee from opposing racist practices,134 the Board should 
also take into account Title VII’s broad standard regarding retaliation 
and how acquiescence to harassing statements can create retaliation 
liability for employers. The Supreme Court broadened the scope of Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision by noting that the claim covers a “mate-
rially adverse” action which includes any action that might have “dis-
suaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of dis-
crimination.”135 
Certainly, black employees will be subjected to materially adverse 
action when employers, faced with evidence of racist statements to-
wards black employees, must still let those statements go without any 
 
 132 See Christine Porath & Christine Pearson, The Price of Incivility, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.–
Feb. 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/01/the-price-of-incivility/ar/1 [https://perma.cc/B55X-WNUA]. 
 133 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (plu-
rality opinion discussing public employer’s interest in efficiency as the basis to outweigh an em-
ployee’s First Amendment interest); Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 (describing the same balance of con-
cerns and allowing employer concerns in addressing key services that the government provides 
the public). 
 134 Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 35 (2005). 
 135 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (citing Rochon v. Gonza-
les, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
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disciplinary action due to the NLRB’s analysis which finds that the rac-
ist statements are protected. There are many cases under Title VII 
where black employees have complained about the use of racist speech 
and epithets.136 One commentator has even asserted that an isolated, 
single racist statement involving the N-word should create hostile en-
vironment liability for an employer.137 
Other cases suggest that an employer’s failure to respond to an iso-
lated, single racist comment may create retaliation liability for an em-
ployer under Title VII. In Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp.,138 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that a black 
employee who had complained about a single, racially derogatory com-
ment was able to establish a retaliation claim.139 The court reversed a 
prior decision holding that an employee could not bring a claim for re-
taliation by opposing an isolated comment since that comment did not 
rise to the level of a severe and pervasive act required for actionable 
harassment under Title VII.140 The court noted that if it applied this 
single comment analysis, it would deter reasonable employees from 
speaking up and deprive them of the right to pursue a retaliation 
claim.141 Also, in Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Regional Transportation 
Authority,142 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
found that a supervisor’s reaction to an employee’s complaint about co-
workers’ racial slurs, in telling the employee to suck it up and get over 
it, was a material adverse action with respect to a retaliation claim. As 
a result, the court noted that “‘unchecked retaliatory co-worker harass-
ment’” can establish a material adverse action warranting a retaliation 
claim against an employer.143 
 
 136 See, e.g., Fisher v. Lufkin Indus. Inc., 847 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2017); Douglas v. J.C. Penney, 
474 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2007); Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 137 See Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, The Creation of a Hostile Work Environment by a Workplace 
Supervisor’s Single Use of the Epithet “Nigger”, 53 AM. BUS. L. J. 383, 384 (2016) (arguing that the 
single use of the epithet is such an “‘extremely serious incident’” that it should be sufficient to 
establish a hostile environment claim). 
 138 786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2015) 
 139 Id. at 284. 
 140 Id. at 274–75. 
 141 Id. at 283; see also Tristin K. Green, Racial Emotion in the Workplace, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 
959, 1019 (2013) (discussing how retaliation analysis must allow employees to oppose practices 
that may not rise to the clear level of actionable harassment as a tool to encourage prophylactic 
measures). 
 142 743 F.3d 11, 26 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 143 Id. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: THE NLRB SHOULD NOT TOLERATE RACIST 
WORKPLACE SPEECH 
Now let’s return to the discussion among the two employees at the 
beginning of this Article. The second employee’s statement was: 
[N]othing will be gained from mentioning Black Lives Matter in 
this union organizing campaign. Black Lives Matter just repre-
sents a crusade to address what happened to a bunch of N-word 
criminals who deserved what they got. All lives matter. . . . [S]top 
being distracted by issues of race and focus on the only division 
that matters in the workplace: class. 
The rationale of allowing rough-and-tumble activity in the heat of the 
moment as supporting concerted activity under Section 7 of the NLRA 
when on the picket line or as a result of an angry outburst towards a 
supervisor does not appear to fit well with this comment. The second 
employee’s decision to use the N-word does not seem to have any real 
relationship to the concerted activity of discussing the selection of a un-
ion. But even if the use of the N-word is considered to be part and parcel 
of the overall comments about selecting a union as concerted activity, 
the employer has a strong interest in regulating this speech as a result 
of the potential problems created for black employees by failing to reg-
ulate racist comments in the workplace. 
Although an employer must send a message to stop racist utter-
ances before they reach the level of being severe and pervasive to create 
a racially hostile environment in violation of Title VII, the need for this 
regulation is not based upon actual compliance with Title VII, per se, 
as usually a single utterance is insufficient to establish liability. Never-
theless, NLRB actions should not easily supersede an employer’s efforts 
to prevent a hostile environment from arising and subjecting that em-
ployer to Title VII liability. Further, the regulation of these comments 
is also necessary because of the tremendous costs to the employer’s ef-
ficient operation by having incivility and bullying permeate the work-
place through the use of racial epithets and other racist statements. 
Employees, who are pursuing their Section 7 rights, should not receive 
protection from the NLRA when using racist speech to effectuate those 
rights. Nor should the NLRB enforce the NLRA in a manner that seems 
to condone the use of racist speech. Under the analysis established in 
this Article, employees with legitimate Section 7 concerns can still seek 
protection for their racist statements when the facts indicate that the 
employer has chosen to take disciplinary action based on the racist 
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statements merely as a pretext to disciplining employees because of 
their concerted activity.144 
The toxic incivility created by allowing employees who utter such 
racist statements to be defended as a matter of right under the NLRA 
also becomes the impetus for the employer’s disciplinary and regulatory 
action related to that speech. Title VII’s broad protection for retaliatory 
employer actions that would deter a reasonable person from pursuing a 
claim suggests that the NLRB’s application of doctrines that result in 
an employer’s inability to respond to racist speech should not be allowed 
absent proof of pretext. Otherwise, a message will be sent to black em-
ployees that it is useless for them to protest racist speech in the work-
place out of fear that the NLRB will find the speech protected. By re-
moving these doctrines that seem to condone racist workplace speech, 
employee productivity and efficiency in the workplace will increase as 
employees can focus on their jobs without being weighed down by un-
civil colleagues who bully and harass through racist statements. 
We no longer operate in the rough-and-tumble times when the 
NLRB had the audacity to adopt certain doctrines (under its responsi-
bilities to enforce the NLRA) that protect racist speech and the utter-
ance of racial epithets either made on the picket line, in an outburst to 
a supervisor, or in any other manner. With the growing diversity of the 
workplace and the legal and moral responsibility that employers have 
to protect black employees from racial harassment, those rough-and-
tumble doctrines should no longer be a viable part of the Board’s anal-
ysis. The current heightened environment regarding protests of racist 
treatment in our society exhibited by the Black Lives Matter movement 
can only be exacerbated by having a federal agency, charged with pro-
tecting workers’ rights, engaged in condoning the use of racist state-
ments in the workplace. 
Employees who are involved in Section 7 activity under the NLRA 
should be sent the message that regardless of the context, racist utter-
ances will not be tolerated. The only saving grace for such racist state-
ments under the NLRA is when the employer takes disciplinary action 
allegedly because of the statements as merely a pretext to its real mo-
tivation of chilling Section 7 activity. A racist statement or utterance of 
a racial epithet should not have to rise to the level of being a threat or 
involve a physical act for it to be considered unprotected under the 
NLRA for coercing black workers in the exercise of their Section 7 
 
 144 See Domsey Trading Corp., 310 N.L.R.B. 777, 778 (1993) (finding that employers may not 
tolerate behavior by non-strikers or replacements but seek to discipline strikers for such behavior); 
Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC., 359 N.L.R.B. 1025 (2013) (finding discriminatory application of 
discipline based on use of racial epithets). 
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rights. Employers, unions, employees, and those who care about issues 
of racism in the workplace in this Black Lives Matter climate will all 
benefit from having the NLRB change its analysis to recognize that rac-
ist statements and utterances of racial epithets should not receive broad 
protection under the NLRA. 
